1. This study purposely excludes the Special Tactics career field as they do have a selection and assessment pipeline that imposes significant physical and academic requirements. The primary focus of this paper is geared towards operational aircrews, but the recommendations could and should be applied towards the majority of the personnel force assigned to AFSOC.
, recruits have come from across the force and experience levels from within the conventional Air Force with no ability for AFSOC to match capability and maturity to the unique special operations mission. This creates a twofold problem; an influx of eager, yet technically immature candidates that are often operating under an incorrect preconceived notion of what special operations truly is. While weapon systems specific training is the path to capability and technical competence, only experience can meet the challenges of maturity and judgment. In years past, even before AFSOC was activated as a major command (MAJCOM), Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF) had the luxury of selecting mature (both age and psyche) members. As each of the services draw down their overall personnel numbers, that luxury no longer exists. As the old saying goes "beggars can't be choosers." AFSOF is one of the few mission areas that is growing as the majority of the Air Force shrinks. So the question is: How can AFSOC inculcate the Air Commando ethos and organizational culture rapidly and efficiently while simultaneously increasing the mission set, and inventory, while also maintaining a high ops tempo in a low density force? This paper will lay out a three-phase program that will introduce, indoctrinate and sustain the desired organizational culture of AFSOC.
The Problem
American Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the victims of their own success.
Deployed immediately after 9/11 to combat Al Qaeda and then the Taliban, US SOF quickly became the weapon of choice in the eyes of many in the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress. The battlefield victories enjoyed by a relatively small specialized force opened the world of SOF to the accolades and scrutiny of a public that previously had little knowledge or exposure.
Misapplying the old adage that "if some is good, surely more must be better" well meaning advocates immediately began calling for more SOF. The legislative affairs office at US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) began fielding an onslaught of Congressional inquiries about topics like Special Forces (SF) troop strengths, throughput of the Naval Special Warfare training pipeline, and the cost of producing a special operator. 2. SOF cannot be mass produced.
3. Quality is better than quantity.
4. Competent SOF cannot be created rapidly after emergencies occur.
5. Most special operations require non-SOF support. 4 The military leadership throughout USSOCOM already knew what their civilian leaders were calling for to be true: the number of special operators around the world had to increase.
The operations tempo (OPSTEMPO) was already taking its toll on the force and it was becoming clear that in order to defeat the enemy there were a great many more interests in the world that required SOF's attention. USSOCOM's challenge was to accomplish the growth without sacrificing quality and yet somehow the timeline demanded that these warriors be mass produced.
The increase was formally directed in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In order to win the war on terrorism the Chairman's assessment said the DOD would "train Up to this point AFSOC only "owned" a single base -Hurlburt Field -and was a tenant at all of its other locations. This kept infrastructure numbers low, but forced AFSOF units to always rely on conventional AF organizations for base operating support (BOS) functions. The acceptance of Cannon AFB was a major step for the command that necessitated the "overnight" inclusion of nearly an entire base worth of non-SOF personnel. People that in some cases had never participated in a joint operation let alone special operations were suddenly considered Air Commandos. The obvious question that arises out of this discussion is why was organizational culture important with regards to this data? Why wasn't this simply an issue of safety or flying training?
distinguish them as current SOF. The higher numbers of younger officers in the mid 90's can likely be attributed to the creation and subsequent rapid growth of the command beginning in May 1990.
To deftly duck that question for the moment let it suffice to say "because AFSOC said so." The command began with safety stand downs and procedural reviews and changes, but there was much more. A two-year study was undertaken by the Chief of Operational Psychology at AFSOC, Colonel Carroll Greene. 9 The topic of that study was the organizational culture of AFSOC, and the near term outcome was the command's first attempt to influence that culture. 13. The author was a newly arrived DO in an overseas squadron when the first Critical Attribute poster and its display stand arrived. The stand was bent and the poster was damaged in shipping. The other twelve posters were never received and the stand and its lone poster remained outside the commander's office for two years.
What is Organizational Culture and Why is it Important?
There is an entire field devoted to the study and definition of organizational culture and absolutely too much literature to accommodate the scope of this paper. Instead, this chapter will strive to find a working definition of organizational culture and its importance to the military and SOF specifically.
Simply put, organizational culture is what the organization and its members believe about itself and its environment and the member norms as they operate in that environment. This is an intentional oversimplification designed to bound an enormous field of research. Edgar Schein is one standout who some considered the father of corporate culture. He defines organizational culture as "the basic tacit assumptions about how the world is and ought to be that a group of people share and that determines their perceptions, thoughts, feelings and their overt behavior." 14 1. Artifacts.
He also divides organizational culture into these three levels:
2. Values.
3. Assumptions.
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Artifacts are the most visible and often tangible objects that the organization relies on as a touchstone of its identity. They are those things that can be held up to the uninitiated to say "this is who we are." Uniform items, slogans and creeds, rituals and personal interactions, some might even argue actual airframes and ones identification with that specific mission qualify as artifacts. Even history is an artifact. All of these can often be easily identified by an outsider.
14. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 224. 15. Ibid. Values are what the organization-both leadership and members-openly state as the professed culture. Statements like "Mission first, family always" or "Anytime, Anyplace" are similar to slogans but they carry a sense of mantra and purpose. These statements are typically made internally to the organization with its members as the target audience.
Assumptions are the true values that the organization believes and represents, sometimes unknowingly. These assumptions may not match the professed values of the organization and they may be so deeply rooted in the psyche of the organization that they unknowingly affect decision processes.
These levels are important because modifying the first two levels rarely leads to lasting or substantial change in the organization and, in theory, can cause more damage when they conflict with the third level. Organizations that say one thing but subconsciously believe something to the contrary create internal turmoil.
Dr. Robert Spulak and Dr. Jessica Glicken Turnley are two scholars who have done a significant amount of work regarding culture and the military. In their separate studies of SOCOM and SOF they both at one time or another sought to answer a fundamental question;
What makes special operations "special" and how does the identity of the special operator impact that? They both make significant remarks regarding behavioral versus character traits. Turnley found that "When viewed from outside, the specialness of SOF often gets characterized as behavioral, rather than character, traits." 16 The critical importance she highlights is that "Character traits are indicators of the potential for certain types of behavior. To sum up:
• Character traits equal the potential for certain behaviors while behavioral traits can be taught.
• Most SOF finds character traits essential to selection but AFSOF is the exception relying on self selection.
• Most importantly culture is critical in nurturing desirable traits.
So if AFSOF survives and thrives when members display appropriate behavioral traits, and those traits can be taught and nurtured by SOF culture, then clearly defining organizational culture and ensuring that it is shared by all members is crucial to AFSOC's success.
Spulak, A Theory of Special Operations, 12.
19. This line of thought presumes that an individual who volunteers to join AFSOC is fully aware of the mission and all of its peculiarities. Two points quickly come to mind: 1) Not everyone who is accessed by AFSOC is a volunteer and 2) In order to maximize the number of volunteers with the "right" traits AFSOC should begin an extensive recruiting campaign within the conventional AF with maximum disclosure of airframe mission specifics.
Spulak, 12.

What is the Air Commando Culture?
This Once again, AFSOF crews had to accept that, as "special" as their missions might be, they would have to contend with a conventionally minded Air Force that did not appreciate their contributions to the US national security and, thus, was not willing to support their activities. This inattention and lack of appreciation was deeply ingrained into the AFSOF culture and inculcated into incoming air commandos. The fact that they received little recognition became a badge of honor for AFSOF crews, as they began to see themselves as "special operators" first and "Airmen" second. 24. There are two additional subcultures that exists within the Air Commando population: 1) Those members that serve in the two overseas groups often see themselves as outsiders to the major AFSOC population. Geographic separation and distant time zones hampers interaction with the HQ and often creates a "forgotten child syndrome." 2) AFSOC aircrew have always been very tribal defining themselves by their airframes and missions. The traditional AF battle of "carnivore" vs "herbivore" is alive and well in AFSOC. Air Commandos talk about the Pave Low or Talon Mafias. The NSAV fleet is generically referred to as the little airplanes. Ideally this paper will generate a cross flow of information that will overcome the "tribes and the "forgotten child."
Whether this is a desirable trait or not is irrelevant.
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25. This was a source of consternation throughout the years amongst various commanders. The Air Commando that was heard to refer to the "Big Air Force" or "Big Blue" often earned a stern lecture about being an Airman first.
It is one of the unspoken assumptions that is deeply rooted in the psyche of the organization. It affects the daily and long term actions and decisions of the command and it needs to be acknowledged to make lasting and effective changes.
Recommendations
The recommendations of this paper will be framed in a three phased plan; introduce, indoctrinate, and sustain. The emphasis will be on the sustain portion of the plan. It would be easy to make recommendations that don't consider resources, funding or time. This plan attempts to work within existing resources and acknowledge the current operations tempo and manning. The realities are that every formal training course is completely filled with mission essential training. Operations tempo is not going to decrease anytime soon and selection and assessment, the battle cry of the faithful just isn't feasible. The goal is to maximize the impact and efficiency of resources that are already resident in the MAJCOM. While many in AFSOC have operated for years under the premise that selection and assessment is the only valid path to a qualified force the findings of this paper and of others suggests there are other paths that can be just as successful.
Introduce
Formal training for AFSOC aircrew is accomplished at one of three locations.
Depending on what airframe an individual is assigned to fly they will go to Hurlburt Field, FL 26 ISOC examines the historical evolution, development, organization, and mission activities of US Special Operations Command and its components. It provides a working knowledge of Air Force special operation forces and emphasizes the joint perspective. The course uses personal ; Kirtland AFB, NM; or Cannon AFB, NM. When a new accession arrives at formal training they receive the Introduction to Special Operations Course (ISOC). It is a three-day course to provide a working knowledge of joint special operations to newly assigned Air Commandos.
26. With half of the MC-130H/P fleet (and soon the CV-22s) stationed in the two overseas groups, it was possible, even likely that a two-tour Air Commando could be an accomplished operator without ever having set foot on Hurlburt Field, the home of the headquarters. All formal flying training and simulator refresher training was accomplished at Kirtland, and that's exactly what happened for an entire generation of Air Commandos.
accounts from elite AFSOF warriors to analyze select special operations missions. A static display familiarizes students with air and special tactics hardware and capabilities. Range Demonstrations give a visual perspective of AFSOC ground capabilities.
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The course gives the candidate a brief view into the community they are about to enter. In years past only aviators were required to attend at the beginning of their flying training and the course was available to other assigned personnel. The single change necessary to maximize the effects of this course is to make it mandatory for all assigned AFSOC personnel within the first six months of assignment. There is an entire population of support personnel that are assigned to AFSOC rather than volunteer. This is also a population that spends far too much of their assignment toiling at their profession never fully understanding the value of their efforts or their contribution to the greater mission.
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Indoctrinate This is the target audience that would benefit from a concise top down review of SOF structure and purpose that ISOC offers. Current AFSOS schedules show the course being offered quarterly at all four of the bases AFSOC occupies. That should allow individuals to accomplish the course within the specified six months. The secondary benefit of the introduction phase coupled with the sustainment phase is the likely increase in multi-term assignments for a population that typically is up and out after a single assignment.
Indoctrination should be mandatory for all operators and perhaps even maintenance and intelligence personnel. AFSOC recently developed a program to meet this need. The newly designed Air Commando Basic Course (ACBC) continues to grow and change but continued 27. AFSOS Home Page, ISOC Course Description, http://www.afsoc.af.mil/usafsos/ 28. The author once developed his own "ISOC-like" brief and presented it to the support personnel resident in the Operational Support Squadron. It was disheartening to witness the lack of SOF knowledge and the number of people that had never heard this basic information in their three-four year assignments. What was gratifying was the number of people attempted to find a second assignment in AFSOC. People thrive when they know their place and their value to the organization.
emphasis should be placed on scenarios requiring teamwork and innovation, stressing the importance of human interaction. The course is currently mandatory for Non-Standard Aviation (NSAv) and designated SOF medical personnel and they must complete ACBC prior to certification as Combat Mission Ready (CMR). This is not intended to be the Air Force version of the Q-Course or BUD/S. The goal is not to screen or discriminate personnel as they have already been assigned to the command, and in the case of the flyers, completed initial qualification training at significant expense. What it does is create a shared experience amongst graduates and appreciation of other special operators they support. The recommendation of this study is that all aircrew and eventually maintainers, intelligence, and designated medical personnel attend the course. Including maintenance and intelligence personnel ties two critical support career fields more closely to the mission they support. It provides lasting lines of communication and interface across functional boundaries early in everyone's career. This is the change in mindset that will require funding, resources, and time to enact. It is not something that will happen overnight but is something the command should strive for. In the meantime there are much smaller steps that can achieve similar results. Including maintenance and intelligence personnel in local aircrew survival exercises can have surprising impact and offer insights that aircrew take for granted. This would offer practical survival skills and mission exposure to nonflyers and present aircrew with the realistic scenario of evading with passengers. Again, there is a secondary benefit to this change in policy. Word will get out through informal channels that there is a challenge to overcome when someone joins AFSOC. Ideally, this will fulfill and enhance Spulak's concept of self selection. The type of people AFSOC seeks will pursue the challenge and prestige of being declared CMR through "trial by fire" will hopefully volunteer for service in AFSOC.
Sustain
Operating under Spulak and Turnley's basic tenets, sustainment is the most influential phase to organizational culture. It is also the cheapest portion to transform. There is an untapped resource existing at the operational level that simply needs to be energized, organized and formalized: The squadron commanders. Squadron commanders are crucial to Air
Commando sustainment as they have the most extensive exposure throughout the Air Commando's career. There is no mandate for a squadron commander to establish a specific SOF education program beyond an officer's implicit responsibility to mentor and develop his/her subordinates. That said, an informal and non-scientific polling of a representative sample of current and former squadron commanders shows that these programs exist and in some cases are thriving. Each of the commanders contacted by the author proudly explained the libraries they established, the history they sustained within the unit or the team building exercises they developed. But as more support functions are removed from the squadron level and time becomes an even greater commodity, too often one of the first things to suffer is the "nice to have" programs. If the commanders network was able to share existing briefings, programs, concepts and solutions via a loose official channel the gains could be exponential. There's obviously nothing stopping current commanders from doing that on their own right now, but this study suggests there would be multifaceted gains from a formal internet based information network. The goal is to use a technology network as a tool to empower commanders and their interactions not replace them. Whether it is a community of practice (COP) or social network style application it should be run by the Air Force Special Operations Training Center (AFSOTC). The possibilities of practice are unlimited but some of the immediate benefits are obvious.
1. Ala carte menus of briefings (joint, historical, capabilities, organizational) for use during squadron, group, wing all calls, and wingmen days.
2. AFSOC Commander's SOF specific reading list as well as unit produced book reviews and library inventories.
3. Up to date information from A-Staff directorates within AFSOC HQ 4. AFSOC and USSOCOM Commander updates and special interest items 5. Individual base papers and public affairs stories Reach back capability would negate time zone and geographical difficulties, as well as ensure the AFSOC Commander had a single point to publish all unclassified guidance and values to each of his commanders. The information would be "pushed" to the commanders rather than "pulled" by them. As well as the ability for squadron commanders to provide timely feedback and questions in forums or message boards. Each commander would receive basic familiarization training during the MAJCOM's squadron commander course, and the squadron commanders could then pass that training on to their operations officers at the unit.
While having the network managed by AFSOTC, may seem like an increase in workload for one organization, the successful implementation would rely on the existing products and subject matter experts resident in the command. AFSOTC, or one of its subordinate units would simply be the clearing house and validator of an information cooperative. This may oversimplify the actual process but the majority of products placed on the network would be created by the squadron, at the request of AFSOTC, and then submitted for review and release. There are historians, weapons school graduates, tacticians and squadron commanders already creating these documents for use in their organizations. AFSOTC oversight allows the sharing of these products while ensuring they meet command standards and compliment desired Air Commando messages and values.
Conclusion
AFSOF must grow in order to maintain its ability to support its SOF brethren. It is a contract that cannot be broken and AFSOC will not fail. The command will overcome the crisis of its current growth spurt. That is not the issue at hand. The issue is the efficient and effective inculcation of new recruits to AFSOC through a standard institutionalized program that ingrains values and assumptions of Air Commando culture. The answer presumed to be the only solution by many for so many years is not the solution at all. Air Commandos are different from the rest of the Air Force but they are different from their Army, Navy and Marine SOF brethren as well.
Selection and assessment is not feasible nor is it necessary to create today's modern day Air
Commando. Through a formalized program new recruits to the command will be introduced, indoctrinated, and sustained in Air Commando culture. The Air Commandos will continue to seek out and recruit the best and the brightest from the conventional force and those that are assigned to AFSOC will be welcomed into a community that values humans and the innovation, improvisation and adaptation that ensures that no mission ever fails.
